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Abstract 
While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been 
implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a 
comprehensive perspective on public perceptions of fairness of carbon pricing and how these 
affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from relevant empirical studies on 
how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade. In addition, we examine their preferences for distinct redistributive and other uses 
of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results 
indicate a high concern for distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on 
poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the 
capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good uses. Somewhat 
surprisingly, most studies do not arrive at clear public preferences for using revenues to assure 
fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer 
using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing 
recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to 
increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups 
with the funding for environmental projects such as on renewable energy. 
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Key policy insights 
- If people perceive carbon pricing instrument as fair policy acceptability and support are 
strengthened.  
- People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy 
instrument increases public policy acceptability.  
- While people expressing a high concern over an uneven distribution of the policy burden, 
they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of inequity 
compensation.  
- Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer 
if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices 
of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.  
- Use of revenues that combine the redistribution of revenue among vulnerable groups and 
support environmental projects such as on renewable energy seem to most increase policy 
acceptability. 
 
 
 
  
  
1. Introduction 
With the Paris Climate Agreement state leaders have accepted that climate change poses a 
serious threat to the biosphere and human welfare. The majority of nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) are not matched by sufficiently effective national policies (Victor et al., 
2017). Many economists, environmental scientists and politicians have called for economy-
wide carbon pricing, whether in the form of a tax or market, as a cornerstone of an effective 
climate policy package to reach the Paris Climate Agreement. The main reason is that carbon 
pricing increases relative prices of high- versus low-carbon goods and services, resulting in an 
effective as well as efficient way of reducing CO2 emissions (Aldy et al., 2010; Nordhaus, 2010; 
Baranzini et al., 2017). In particular, all prices in the economy will reflect direct and indirect 
CO2 emissions generated during the entire production cycle of associated products and 
services. In other words, carbon pricing represents a systemic policy affecting all carbon-based 
decisions in economy, equally discouraging emissions by consumers and producers, 
stimulating cleaner energy production. Moreover, carbon prices do not draw on government 
budgets but even generate revenues that can be used for funding public investments in 
climate innovation and adaptation, or for compensating any inequitable effects (High-level 
Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017).  
Despite such arguments in favour, and over 50 carbon pricing schemes implemented or 
planned around the world (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018), the instrument still meets 
considerable public and political resistance. People’s low acceptability influenced the 
cancellation of a carbon pricing scheme in 2014 in Australia (Crowley, 2017), the rejection of 
ballot initiatives in 2016 and 2018 to impose a carbon tax in Washington State (Carattini et al., 
2019) or the popular protests in France at the end of 2018 which led to the suspension of a 
carbon tax for six months (Willsher, 2018). Arguably, in the French case a lack of recycling of 
carbon tax revenues to households and a simultaneous cancellation of a wealth tax played a 
role as well. Perceived (un)fairness of carbon pricing has been found to be significantly 
correlated with its (low) public acceptability5 (Hammar and Jagers, 2007; Dreyer and Walker, 
2013; Clayton, 2018). We assume that carbon pricing fairness relates to individuals’ 
perceptions arising from a judgment process regarding the policy instrument (Grasso, 2007). 
Accounting for people’s opinions and public acceptability of climate change policies is 
important as these affect political choices (Dresner et al., 2006a; Anderson et al., 2017). The 
lack of acceptability6 is also one reason why most existing carbon pricing schemes are weak, 
i.e. exhibit relatively low price levels. Almost half (46%) of emissions covered by carbon pricing 
are priced at less than US$10/tCO2e (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018). This is substantially lower 
than the price level consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature target, which 
according to the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, should be at least US$40–80/tCO2 
by 2020 and US$50–100/tCO2 by 2030 (High-level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017). 
                                                             
5 The literature we review here uses distinct terms indicating similar concepts, such as policy 
acceptance, acceptability and support. These are not always clearly defined or distinguished. For this 
reason, we abstain from making a sharp distinction between them as well. For an in-depth discussion of 
the concepts, see Kyselá et al. (2019).  
6 Other factors than perceived fairness affect public acceptability of climate policy, such as negative 
effects on international competitiveness and exports, or more generally on the economy and 
employment. 
  
Moreover, some research suggests that increasing people’s perceived fairness in the context of 
a CO2 car tax can diminish scepticism about the effectiveness of the policy (Bolderdijk et al., 
2017). Taken together, unravelling fairness perceptions related to carbon pricing can 
contribute to an improved design of planned and existing carbon pricing schemes so as to 
make them consistent with the targets of the Paris Agreement.  
Here we examine which aspects of perceived fairness have been addressed in studies 
and how they affect policy acceptability. This assessment involves collecting concerns raised by 
the general public and sometimes of specific stakeholders, such as policy makers and business 
representatives. Our analytical framework, shown in Figure 1, is derived from findings of the 
fairness literature applied to carbon pricing and the related issue of environmental taxation 
(Kim et al., 2013; Dreyer et al., 2013). It describes that people’s judgement of fairness is 
influenced by perceptions of individual (fairness to me) and collective (fairness to others) 
consequences of the policy, as well as its design and procedural aspects. One dimension of 
perceived fairness related to the individual consequences can be interpreted as: are the 
consequences to the self (´me´) fair or unfair. Such perceived personal consequences include 
expected higher economic costs for the individual (Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011) and less 
personal freedom because of regulatory constraints (Baron and Jurney, 1993). Perceived 
collective consequences of carbon pricing, i.e. fairness to others or everyone, include 
distributional effects. Examples are disproportional costs for households that are poor  or live 
in remote areas (Jagers and Hammar, 2009; Clayton, 2018), due to them spending a relatively 
large share of their disposable income on carbon-intensive goods and services like home 
heating, while the latter being relatively car and thus petrol dependent. Carbon pricing without 
complementary measures or particular uses of its revenues tend to be regressive (Baranzini et 
al., 2000; Grainger and Kolstad, 2010), notwithstanding that some research suggests that it 
might be progressive or neutral in certain low- and medium-income countries (Dorband et al., 
2019).  
With regard to underlying perceptions of procedural fairness, we considered a wide 
range of aspects, because we rely on the definition of procedural fairness being “the proper 
adherence to the rules relevant to a procedure and, by extension, as the correct application of 
such rules to all cases which are alike within the terms of the rules (formal or informal, explicit 
or implicit) which are consistently applied to all individuals” (Hay, 1995:501). Hence, for 
instance, people’s low trust in politicians using revenues generated by carbon pricing in a 
proper way is an aspect included in this category. The reason is that when people express lack 
of trust in that the government would keep its promises about revenue use, it refers to a 
disregard of a relevant procedural rule, i.e. do what you vowed. We have also included 
‘distrust in government’ as a relevant procedural aspect. When people express that they do 
not trust politicians because, for instance, they promote carbon pricing with the aim to 
generate additional governmental funds rather than mitigate climate change, it refers to a 
relevant procedural rule, i.e. follow the presumed goal of the policy which is to mitigate 
climate change.  
Studies further indicate that certain allocations of the revenues generated by carbon 
pricing can change people’s perceptions of the fairness of the policy because, for instance, 
they ameliorate regressive impacts. Consequently, the level of acceptability depends on how 
carbon pricing revenues are used (Carattini, 2017; Jagers et al., 2018; Klenert et al., 2018).  In 
particular, we will review here evidence from empirical studies to get a more systematic 
  
understanding of whether using revenues from carbon pricing that make the policy fairer 
contribute to more policy acceptability than other uses. 
We have included both carbon taxes and tradable permit (cap and trade) schemes. 
Carbon taxes apply a duty to goods and services in accordance with their carbon content. Cap 
and trade schemes set a limit on CO2 emissions and distribute CO2 permits among emitters 
accordingly. These permits can be bought and sold by companies or consumers in a market. To 
regulate emissions from individuals, a tradable permit scheme could either be implemented 
upstream, i.e. amongst fuel producers, or downstream, i.e. amongst individual consumers. 
There are very few studies dealing with people’s perceptions of fairness of upstream tradable 
permit schemes because their impacts are difficult to perceive. However, there are some 
studies dealing with people’s opinions over downstream schemes known as personal carbon 
allowances.   
Previous literature reviews have been undertaken regarding climate policy support in 
general (Drews and van den Bergh, 2016) and carbon pricing in particular (Carattini et al., 
2018; Klenert et al., 2018). Our paper differs from these because our review focuses more 
thoroughly on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon 
taxes and cap-and-trade and their perceived fairness; whereas others covered many more 
factors influencing public policy support.  
Figure 1 illustrates the connection between the fairness aspects discussed, the perceived 
fairness of carbon pricing and acceptability. It accounts for people recognizing carbon pricing 
to involve personal, distributional and procedural aspects, which jointly affect people’s 
perceived overall fairness of carbon pricing as pointed out in the literature (analyzed in Section 
3.1). In turn, this perception influences acceptability of the instrument, which is addressed in 
Section 3.2. An innovative element of this review is the attention given to the use of carbon 
pricing revenues and how this affects perceived fairness and acceptability (addressed in 
Section 4). This involves two channels. The first one corresponds mostly to revenue uses (e.g. 
redistributive) that affect people’s perceptions of personal consequences, distributional effects 
and procedural aspects of carbon pricing and, consequently, influence people’s perception of 
fairness and policy acceptability. The second channel refers to environmental and other uses 
of revenues that affect policy acceptability without being mediated by fairness. This review 
should be regarded as an exploratory attempt to address the relevance of fairness in 
explaining people’s acceptability of carbon pricing. Thus, we shed light on people’s perceptions 
of personal, distributional, procedural aspects that influence people’s perceived fairness that 
have a significant role in policy acceptability.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Relationships between fairness aspects and public acceptability of carbon pricing. The arrows 
and boxes in the figure refer only to the mechanisms analysed in the study. 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the procedure 
used to select primary studies to be reviewed. Section 3 systematically reports findings of the 
review regarding the impact of carbon pricing on policy acceptability through perceptions as 
discussed in relation to Figure 1 above. Section 4 analyses whether people prefer uses of 
carbon pricing revenues that make the policy fairer. Section 5 discusses potential reasons that 
explain why people show high concern over distributional effects of carbon pricing but do not 
rank highly revenue uses aimed at making the policy fairer. Section 6 provides conclusions and 
recommendations for improving the acceptability of carbon-pricing proposals.  
 
2. Literature search and method of analysis 
An extensive literature search of studies dealing with people’s opinion on carbon pricing 
schemes with a focus on perceived fairness was conducted using the academic database 
‘Scopus’. We aimed at covering a wide range of fields, from economics to psychology and 
political science. To this end, a variety of search terms were used: (accepta* OR view OR 
attitude OR opinion OR preference) AND (“carbon pric*” OR “carbon trad*” OR “carbon tax” 
OR “ecological tax reform” OR “cap and trade” OR “energy tax” OR “environmental tax” OR 
“climate tax” OR “permit trad*” OR “emission trad*” OR fee OR dividend) AND (equity OR 
fairness OR “recycling revenue” OR “distribut*” OR equality OR social OR poverty OR rebate 
OR earmark OR justice). We further included in the sample relevant studies cited in the 
reference list of papers found through Scopus. Studies were included if they: (i) involved 
analysis of primary empirical data and (ii) made explicit reference to carbon pricing or (iii) 
addressed other price instruments (e.g. fuel taxes) in the context of climate change. Note that 
the third criterion means that we did not include more general studies of environmental taxes 
or road pricing. While possibly not exhaustive, this procedure ensures a comprehensive 
coverage of the literature.  
  
A total of 43 empirical studies were identified, among which 37 deal with carbon taxes 
and similar schemes (such as environmental tax reform), three studies with cap and trade 
schemes and three studies with both schemes together. We extracted the following 
information from each study: authors; journal and year of publication; location of the study 
(country); research objective; method; year of data collection; sample size and 
representativeness; type of stakeholder questioned; discipline or research area to which the 
study belongs; characteristics of the carbon pricing instrument; whether or not carbon pricing 
was implemented in the considered country at the time of the study; people’s perceptions of 
personal consequences, distributional effects and procedural aspects; and effects of these on 
people's acceptability of carbon pricing; preferences for uses of revenues and their effects on 
fairness and policy acceptability.  
Most studies were published after 2006 with only three studies as exception. In terms of 
representativeness of the studies, 18 of the 29 quantitative studies reported to be 
representative of the scale that the study was conducted: three of them being representative 
at the city level and the others at the whole country or state level). Our results show that 
English-speaking countries are overrepresented in the sample of studies analysed. Most 
studies were undertaken in the USA (Ten papers; 18% of the whole sample of studies), 
followed by United Kingdom (eight papers, 14%), Australia and Sweden with six papers (11%) 
undertaken in each country (see Figure 2). Moreover, almost all countries except Australia, 
India and South Africa are North American and European countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Countries where carbon pricing studies were conducted 
 
In order to analyse personal, distributional and procedural aspects associated with 
carbon pricing as perceived by respondents in primary studies, we identify excerpts from the 
articles reviewed related with concerns expressed by respondents about carbon pricing. We 
cluster the excerpts that expressed identical or similar aspects of carbon pricing and 
systematically coded them in order to establish different types of personal, distributional or 
procedural concerns. We counted the number of papers that reported each concern. Note that 
all opinions reported belong to the general public, except when a concrete group of 
  
stakeholders is specified, which mainly corresponds to business representatives and decision-
makers. The broad spectrum of studies we wanted to include and the diversity of 
methodological approaches they used generated challenges in terms of data analysis and 
comparability. Most studies did not ask people to list their perceived personal, distributional 
and procedural concerns but rather the researchers evaluated people’s perceptions of policy 
impacts presented to them. Thus, our results should be understood in terms of which 
perceived personal, distributional and procedural concerns are more or less frequently 
addressed in the literature and people’s opinion regarding them. With the aim of assessing the 
effects of perceptions on acceptability of the policy instrument, we counted the number of 
papers that found a relationship between respondents’ perceptions and acceptability of the 
policy instrument. We distinguish the results from qualitative (interviews and focus groups) 
and quantitative (questionnaire survey) studies while also adding nuances for each as they 
cover different types of data. For example, the quantitative studies report the statistical 
significance of the relationship between perceived effects and policy acceptability. To assess 
people’s preferences for different uses of revenues, we used the available information on how 
people rank them. Next, we assessed whether those uses that can potentially make the policy 
fairer are also the ones most preferred. Finally, we examined the influence of the use of 
revenues on instrument acceptability by counting the number of papers that found a 
relationship between these two variables.  
 
3. Fairness and acceptability of carbon pricing  
3.1. Perceived personal consequences, distributional effects and procedural aspects  
The articles reviewed identified a variety of perceived personal consequences, distributional 
effects and procedural aspects of carbon pricing. Table 1 provides a list of these effects and 
aspects that appeared in more than one study along with how many studies mentioned each 
instance.  
Table 1. Perceived aspects of carbon pricing, ordered by frequency in primary studies 
Perceived personal effects Number of studies 
Higher energy prices and less 
purchasing power 
13 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Beuermann and 
Santarius, 2006; Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch and Dunne, 
2006; Dresner et al., 2006b; Harwatt et al., 2011; 
Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011; Kaplowitz and McCright, 
2015; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013; Lo et al., 2013α; O'Connor 
et al., 2002; Owen et al., 2008α) 
Loss of jobs 5 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Carattini et al. 2017; Clinch 
and Dunne, 2006; Clinch et al., 2006; O'Connor et al. 2002) 
Less comfort and wellbeing 4 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Baron and Jurney, 1993; 
Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; Harwatt et al., 2011)   
Limits freedom of choice 4 (Baron and Jurney, 1993; Harwatt et al., 2011α; O'Connor 
et al., 2002; Owen et al., 2008β) 
  
Voluntary behaviour punished rather 
than appreciated 
3 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Klok 
et al., 2006) 
Perceived distributional effects 
 
Impacts on poor households (fuel 
poverty) 
14 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; 
Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Clinch et al., 2006; Dresner et al., 
2006a; Dresner et al., 2006b; Harwatt et al., 2011; 
Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011; 
Kaplowitz and McCright, 2015; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013; 
Lo et al., 2013α; Owen et al., 2008β)   
Policy burden unevenly distributed 
between firms and households or 
among the latter 
11 (Baron and Jurney, 1993; Beuermann and Santarius, 
2006; Brannlund and Persson, 2012; Carattini et al., 2017; 
Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; 
Dresner et al., 2006a; Harwatt et al., 2011β; Klok et al., 
2006; Lo, 2013; Owen et al., 2008β)   
Policy burden unevenly distributed 
among provinces, states or countries 
5 (Brannlund and Persson, 2012; Carson et al., 2010; Klok et 
al., 2006; Lachapelle et al., 2012; Lo, 2013) 
Impacts on rural households  4 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Harwatt et al., 2011; 
Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Owen et al., 2008α) 
Impacts on the elderly and people in 
need of care 
4 (Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Dresner et al., 2006b; 
Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Owen et al., 2008β)  
Exemptions and privileges given to 
some sectors 
4 (Carson et al., 2010; Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix 
and Leveque, 2006; Dresner et al., 2006b) 
Initial distribution of permits 2 (Bristow et al., 2010 α; Harwatt et al., 2011 α)  
Perceived procedural aspects  
Distrust in government 12 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; 
Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; 
Dresner et al., 2006a; Dresner et al., 2006b; Hammar and 
Jagers, 2006; Hsu et al., 2008; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013; Lo 
et al., 2013α; Owen et al., 2008α)    
Distrust in good use of revenues of 
carbon pricing 
9 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; 
Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Clinch et al., 2006; Dresner et al., 
2006a; Dresner et al., 2006b; Hsu et al., 2008; Kallbekken 
and Aasen, 2010; Kaplowitz and McCright, 2015) 
Dissatisfaction with governmental 
information provision about the policy  
7 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; 
Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; Dresner et al., 2006a; 
Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013)  
Insufficient consultation of social 
partners 
3 (Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; 
Klok et al., 2006)  
Distrust in markets  2 (Lo et al., 2013α; Owen et al., 2008α) 
Notes: Most studies deal only with carbon taxes, except for the ones indicated by: 
α Deals with cap-and-trade scheme. 
β Deals with both carbon tax and cap-and-trade scheme. 
 
 
 
  
Perceived personal effects  
The most mentioned personal consequence of carbon pricing in the reviewed studies is that it 
may imply higher energy prices and less purchasing power.7 This effect was reported in 
thirteen studies. For instance, Carattini et al. (2017) find that an argument widely used by the 
opponents of carbon taxes in Switzerland was that higher carbon tax rates would increase the 
consumer price of energy. Respondents in Kaplowitz and McCright (2015) referred to 
structural constraints that citizens face, such as the lack of alternatives to driving as one 
argument against a gasoline tax which would generate unacceptable additional expenditures. 
Among these studies, six of them addressed the reduction of purchasing power. For instance, 
many Swiss respondents (67% of a sample of 338 individuals) in Baranzini and Carattini (2017) 
were concerned about a reduction in consumption and purchasing power due to the 
implementation of a carbon tax. The loss of jobs as a potential impact of carbon pricing was 
mentioned in five studies. Irish and English citizens participating in focus groups undertaken by 
Clinch et al. (2006) stated that the implementation of an environmental tax reform could lead 
to job losses in their countries. Four studies reported a concern for less comfort and well-being 
as a consequence of carbon pricing instruments. Beuermann and Santarius (2006) reported 
that German respondents were worried about the implications of an environmental tax reform 
on their daily lives, particularly regarding the maintenance of their living standards, due to an 
increase in fuel prices. Four studies indicate that carbon pricing limits freedom of choice. For 
instance, Owen et al. (2008) found that some UK participants in focus groups expressed 
considerable reluctance to the idea of imposing limits on individual carbon emissions. People 
were concerned about the government exerting influence over how they live and what they 
consume. Three studies mention voluntary behaviour punished rather than appreciated. This 
effect relates to “motivational crowding-out” which denotes that carbon pricing weakens 
people’s intrinsic motivations and decreases their voluntary efforts to reduce carbon emissions 
(Frey and Jegen, 2001). This effect links to fairness perceptions in the sense that some people 
feel they are unfairly “punished” by a carbon tax because they already undertook voluntary 
‘climate action’ (e.g. Baranzini et al. 2014). That is, they would have to incur an extra-cost due 
to the tax, no matter whether they have already undertaken voluntary climate action.  
Perceived distributional effects 
The distributional impacts of carbon pricing that received most attention, namely in 14 studies, 
were impacts on poor households. Respondents in Beuermann and Santarius (2006), Clinch and 
Dunne (2006) and Kallbekken and Aasen (2010) expressed the concern that when people have 
few low-carbon options available, a carbon tax affects poor households harder than wealthier 
ones. Unlike the latter, the first suffer a relatively high cost or are even forced to refrain from 
consuming the taxed good or service. Clinch and Dunne (2006) reported that at the time of 
their study Ireland had one of the highest fuel poverty rates in Europe. This may have 
contributed to respondents worrying that implementing an environmental tax reform hinders 
access to heating fuel for many households, particularly for those outside the tax system and 
thus unable to benefit from a reduction in labour taxes. Among business representatives 
interviewed, only those in Ireland expressed concern about effects on poor households 
                                                             
7 Terms in italics denote impacts identified in Table 1. 
  
whereas those from Denmark, France, Germany and the UK did not pay much attention to 
poverty worsening by environmental tax reform (Dresner et al., 2006a). 
Eleven studies referred to a policy burden unevenly distributed between firms and 
households or among the latter. Some of these identified concerns about the regressive nature 
of the instrument in a general way. For instance, in Baron and Jurney (1993), most individuals 
thought that a gasoline tax to combat global warming would unfairly distribute the costs of 
change. Other studies considered unfair that the burden of the policy is ultimately passed onto 
consumers through the increase of prices of C02-intensive products (Clinch and Dunne, 2006). 
Some people alleged that companies would be able to write off most of the policy burden in a 
way that the ordinary tax-payer would not. Respondents in other studies, such as Owen et al. 
(2008), focused on the implications for high-income people and argued that they will be able 
to afford whatever level of taxation was imposed on them, generating an unfair situation with 
respect to low-income households.  
Respondents in five studies expressed concerns over the implications of the policy 
burden unevenly distributed among provinces, states or countries. There are two different 
scales, uneven geographic distribution between and within countries. In the first case, 
Brannlund and Persson (2012) reported that Swedish respondents preferred a reduction of 
CO2 emissions taking place at the European level (EU) rather than only at Sweden scale in 
order to share the burden of reducing emissions. They also found that Swedish people appear 
to be equally concerned about social and geographical distributions of the policy burden. With 
regards to uneven distribution within the same country, Lachapelle et al. (2012) show that a 
majority of Americans (59%) and Canadians (62%) do not appear to worry much about fairness 
implications due to an uneven distribution of the policy burden among the state and the 
provincial levels because they reject the idea that action taken by their respective 
state/province should be conditional upon the actions of others. Four studies showed that 
people are concerned about impacts on rural households. Respondents in Baranzini et al. 
(2014) suggested this, as there are fewer possibilities of substitution between private and 
public transportation in the countryside than in urban areas.   
Next, participants in four studies mentioned impacts on the elderly and people in need of 
care because they probably need to stay more time at home and have higher expenditure of 
fuel for heating their homes. For instance, Dresner et al. (2006b) reported this concern among 
UK respondents. Four studies identify concern about exemptions and privileges given to some 
sectors. Some participants in the study in Dresner et al. (2006b) criticised that the Climate 
Change Levy in UK avoided taxing the coal industry. Carson et al. (2010) found that a small 
majority (53.7%) of Australian respondents was in favour of not giving special treatment to 
energy intensive sectors. Not surprisingly perhaps, business representatives expressed a 
completely different opinion, highlighting the positive effect of exemptions on firms’ 
competitiveness and criticised carbon taxes (Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Klok et al., 2006).  
The initial distribution of permits has been identified as one of the main determinants of 
distributional impacts of tradable permits. For instance, Bristow et al. (2010) analysed the 
preferred distribution of permit allocation from a personal carbon trading scheme among UK 
residents. The most preferred option was the one based on an equal allocation to all with extra 
permits for those with greater needs, for example, living in rural areas, poor housing or having 
any disability. On the contrary, the most unacceptable allocation was the one that permits 
were allocated to adults based on a Government assessment of needs. 
  
A study by Hammar and Jagers (2007) analysed people’s perception of the distribution 
of the burden of reducing CO2 from private car transportation taking into account three 
distributional principles (equity, needs-based and equality). It found that most respondents 
(75%) perceived as fair that people who pollute the most decrease their emissions more than 
others, in line with what they call “equity principle”. Fewer respondents (54%) judged as fair 
that people who need their cars the least, e.g. who have good access to public transportation, 
should decrease their emissions more than others, in line with a so-called “needs-based 
principle”. Less than half of the respondents (48%) judged as fair that everybody should 
decrease their emissions at the same rate, e.g. by 10%, in line with what they call an “equality 
principle”.  
Perceived procedural aspects 
The procedural aspect of carbon pricing that created most concern among respondents was 
distrust in the government, mentioned in twelve studies by a significant amount of 
respondents. Such distrust appears to take various forms. For instance, in a study for Sweden, 
Hammar and Jagers (2006) showed that 64% of a sample of 1270 respondents expressed a low 
level of trust in politics in general terms. A study for Ireland by Clinch and Dunne (2006) 
reported distrust in the capacities of the government to implement an environmental tax 
reform. In addition, Beuermann and Santarius (2006) found that distrust from German 
respondents in the government was motivated by the insufficient information about carbon 
pricing provided by the administration. A related procedural aspect, identified by nine studies, 
relates to distrust in the government for the use of carbon pricing revenues. These indicated a 
lack of trust in that the government would keep its promises about revenue use (e.g. lowering 
labour taxes) or guaranteeing revenue neutrality (see e.g., Hsu et al., 2008; Beuermann and 
Santarius, 2006).  
Seven studies reported dissatisfaction with governmental information provision about 
the policy. For instance, Kallbekken and Aasen (2010) found for Norway that one third of 
respondents thought providing information about policy instruments such as taxes is 
necessary to make them understandable. Moreover, respondents in Klok et al. (2006) declared 
that the government should provide information about whether CO2 reduction objectives had 
been met. Similarly, both business representatives and general public from Germany 
expressed their concerns about making the environmental tax reform more transparent 
(Beuermann and Santarius, 2006). Respondents from three studies referred to the insufficient 
consultation of social partners in designing and implementing carbon pricing. Deroubaix and 
Leveque (2006) showed that controversies about environmental tax reform in France emerged 
due to a very small number of protagonists taking part in key decisions concerning its design, a 
process characterized by confidential negotiations with energy-intensive industries’ 
representatives and exclusion of unions and NGOs. Respondents in two studies expressed 
distrust in market mechanisms to deal with CO2 reduction. For instance, Lo et al. (2013) found 
that the possibility of cheating and market manipulation was deemed to be the biggest issue 
surrounding emission trading schemes by respondents.  
Only one study, for the UK, compared people’s perceptions of the three policy 
instruments – carbon tax, personal carbon trading and upstream carbon trading (Owen et al., 
2008). Some participants of the focus groups thought that (downstream) personal carbon 
  
trading is a more equitable approach than either (upstream) emissions trading or a carbon tax. 
However, the latter two instruments were considered as being easier to implement.  
3.2. Effects of perceptions on policy acceptability 
Now we move to the next step in our analysis, which is guided by the question whether 
perceived fairness of carbon pricing affects public acceptability of it. Table 2 presents a 
summary of our findings. 
  
  
 
 
Table 2. Influence of fairness perceptions on people's policy acceptability  
Fairness perceptions Significant effect Non-significant effect γ Influence on 
acceptability 
Personal effects 
Higher energy prices and less purchasing 
power 
8 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Beuermann and Santarius, 
2006*; Brannlund and Persson, 2012; de Groot and Schuitema, 
2012; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu, 2015; Kallbekken and Saelen, 
2011; Kotchen et al., 2017; O'Connor et al., 2002) 
n/a - 
Loss of jobs 1 (O'Connor et al. 2002) 2 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; 
Carattini et al., 2017) 
- 
Policy does not limit freedom of choice 2 (Baron and Jurney, 1993; O'Connor et al., 2002) n/a + 
Less comfort or wellbeing 1 (de Groot and Schuitema, 2012) 1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) - 
Voluntary behaviour punished rather than 
appreciated  
n/a 1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) - 
Distributional effects 
Neutral cost distribution (all citizens pay the 
same share of income) 
4 (Baranzini et al., 2014*; Brannlund and Persson, 2012; Gevrek 
and Uyduranoglu, 2015; Hammar and Jagers, 2007) 
n/a + 
Regressive incidence (all citizens pay the same 
amount; effects on the poor) 
3 (Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch et al., 2006*; Kallbekken and 
Saelen, 2011) 
1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) - 
Progressive incidence (higher-income citizens 
pay a larger share of income) 
3 (Brannlund and Persson, 2012; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu, 
2015; Hammar and Jagers, 2007) 
n/a + 
Assuring that large industries are subject to a 
carbon price 
2 (Dreyer and Walker, 2013; Dreyer et al., 2015) n/a + 
Expected cooperation in energy conservation’s 
effort from fellow-citizens 
1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) n/a + 
Exemptions and privileges given to some 
sectors 
1 (Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006*)   n/a - 
Policy burden unevenly distributed among 
provinces, states or countries  
1 (Brannlund and Persson, 2012) n/a - 
Policy burden shared among provinces, states 
or countries  
1 (Brannlund and Persson, 2012) n/a + 
  
Responsibility for future generations  1 (Beuermann and Santarius, 2006*) n/a + 
Impacts on rural households n/a 1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) - 
Procedural aspects 
Satisfaction with governmental information 
provision about the policy 
8 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Beuermann and Santarius, 
2006*; Carattini et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Dresner et al., 
2006a*; Hsu et al., 2008; Klok et al., 2006*; Lo et al., 2013 α *)  
1 (Rhodes et al., 2014) + 
Trust in government 7 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Dresner et al., 2006b*; 
Hammar and Jagers, 2006; Jagers et al., 2010  α; Kallbekken and 
Saelen, 2011; Lo et al., 2013 α *; Owen et al., 2008  α *) 
n/a + 
Limited understanding of the policy 1 (Dresner et al., 2006a*) n/a - 
Overall fairness  6 (Clayton, 2018; Clinch and Dunne, 2006*; Dreyer and Walker, 
2013; Dreyer et al., 2015; Jagers et al., 2010 α ; Jagers et al., 
2018)  
1 (Baron and Jurney, 1993) + 
Note:  
γ Non-significant, relating to a quantitative study. 
* Qualitative study (all other studies are quantitative).  
α Deals with cap-and-trade scheme. 
 
 
  
  
Effects of perceived personal effects on acceptability 
Several perceived personal consequences were found to have an effect on policy acceptability 
(see Table 2). Here we explain the effects found in more than one study. Seven quantitative 
studies and one qualitative study reported that higher energy prices and less purchasing power 
decreased acceptability of carbon pricing. For instance, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) found 
that affirming that carbon taxes are an issue for purchasing power is linked with about 15% 
lower probability of accepting the instrument. In the case of the qualitative study, respondents 
giving importance to individual economic interests were less inclined to vote positively to 
carbon pricing (Beuermann and Santarius, 2006). Three studies found that perceptions of 
potential loss of jobs due to carbon pricing influenced negatively in predicting people’s 
acceptability, although two of them were not significant (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; 
Carattini et al., 2017). Another relevant effect positively influencing people’s acceptability of 
carbon pricing found in two studies was the perception that the policy does not limit freedom 
of choice. 
Effects of perceived distributional effects on acceptability 
With respect to distributional effects, four studies found that a neutral cost distribution, i.e. all 
citizens pay the same share of income, increases people’ policy acceptability. This is illustrated 
by two studies in which a change from a regressive cost distribution (all citizens pay the same 
amount) to a neutral one affected positively the acceptance of the policy. Similarly, Baranzini 
et al. (2014) found that some people would accept a tax if it was proportional to income and 
consumption, therefore based on the situation of each household. Meanwhile, Hammar and 
Jagers (2007) assess people’s perceived fairness based on people’s preference for one of the 
three distributional principles of the burden of carbon tax affecting private car transportation. 
They found that what they call the “equality principle” seems most important in increasing 
acceptability of a higher carbon tax, that is, everybody should decrease their emissions the 
same, e.g. by 10%. The perception that the instrument could be regressive was found to 
influence its rejection in two quantitative studies and another qualitative study, although it 
was also found to not significantly affect acceptability in Baranzini and Carattini (2017).The 
progressive distribution of the costs of the instrument determined people’s acceptability of 
carbon pricing in three studies. As an example, Hammar and Jagers (2007) revealed that policy 
acceptability increased if those who should decrease their emissions the most are those who 
needed their cars the least, e.g. who had access to public transportation. This distribution of 
the policy costs followed what the authors called a “needs-based principle”. People who 
accepted the carbon tax in Dreyer and Walker (2013) and Dreyer et al. (2015) had a higher 
belief in assuring that large industries are subject to a carbon price than those who did not.   
 
Effects of perceived procedural aspects on acceptability 
Concerning procedural aspects, four quantitative studies and four qualitative ones found that 
policy acceptability increases when people are satisfied with governmental information 
provision about the policy. Two of them (Klok et al., 2006; Lo et al., 2013) showed that this is 
particularly the case when the information emphasizes the effectiveness of the policy 
  
instrument. Nevertheless, another study found that having information about the instrument 
did not affect acceptability significantly (Rhodes et al., 2014). Trust in the government was 
reported in four quantitative studies and three qualitative study as increasing the probability 
of acceptability of carbon pricing. Hammar and Jagers (2006) further reported a strong role of 
trust showing that motorists who trust their politicians were not more likely to resist CO2 tax 
increases than high-trusting persons with no access to a car. On the contrary, low-trusting 
people with access to a car were the group to be most strongly against an increased CO2 tax.  
 
Effects of perceived overall fairness on acceptability 
Five quantitative studies and one qualitative study in Table 2 found that perceived overall 
fairness positively affects public acceptability of carbon pricing (Table 2). For instance, Dreyer 
et al. (2015) and Dreyer and Walker (2013) measured perceived overall fairness of a carbon tax 
that held industries responsible for emissions they release and included a compensation 
package for households indirectly impacted. The latter study found not only that individuals 
who reported higher levels of perceived fairness were more likely to find the policy acceptable 
but also that for a one-unit increase in the levels of perceived fairness, an individual was about 
two and a half times more likely to support the policy. Only one study from the sample showed 
no significant relationship between perceived fairness and acceptability or support for the 
instrument (Baron and Jurney, 1993). 
 
4. Fair revenue recycling and acceptability of carbon pricing 
4.1 People’s preferences for use of carbon pricing revenues  
A unique feature of carbon pricing is that it generates revenues which can be used for various 
purposes, with potential consequences for equity, environment and political support. 
Information regarding how people feel about different revenue uses can arguably improve 
political decisions about these by knowing which uses count on more public support and can 
therefore increase overall political acceptability and feasibility. For this reason we shed light on 
the preferred uses of revenues by the general public that received attention in the studies 
reviewed. We focus on whether people prefer uses of revenues that ameliorate the regressive 
effects of carbon pricing. We therefore distinguish between three main types of uses of the 
revenues: environmental, redistributive and other type of uses. Environmental uses refers to 
funding projects that reduce CO2 emissions or fund low-carbon energy sources, redistributive 
uses denote achieving a less regressive outcome, and other uses cover the reduction of 
existing taxes or inclusion in the general government budget. The most preferred use of 
revenues is funding environmental projects, as reported in fifteen studies (Table 3). The 
preference for using the revenues for environmental purposes depends on the kind of project 
proposed, where funding research and development of renewable energies was the 
`environmental project´ most mentioned, whereas  purchasing foreign carbon credits received 
the lowest preference in Carattini et al. (2017). Admittedly, most studies do not properly 
specify the concrete environmental allocation of the revenues to have an accurate assessment 
of people’s preferences. For instance, they used general terms such as “environmental 
earmarking” or “environmental projects” without it always being clear what this entailed. Even 
studies that referred to renewable energy projects are unclear as governments do not tend to 
  
fund such projects, but at best subsidize innovation or adoption of environmental projects 
such as on renewable energy. Another revenue-use option within the environmental uses 
preferred in two studies was funding technological innovation and energy efficiency, such as 
grants for residential insulation or subsidies for energy-efficient innovations. This option was 
the most popular among business representatives (Clinch and Dunne, 2006; Dresner et al., 
2006) who claimed that they needed technology grants and financial support to ensure 
improvements in energy efficiency. Some business representatives, though, regarded using 
revenues for investment subsidies as unfair as it kind of punishes companies that already 
undertook energy efficiency efforts voluntarily and rewards ones that did not (Klok et al., 
2006).  
 
 
Table 3. People’s preferences for use of revenues reported in more than one study 
Use of revenues Most preferred 
option 
Second most 
preferred option 
Third preferred 
option 
Least preferred 
option 
Environmental  
Environmental projects 15* 3 (Carson et al., 
2010; Klok et al., 
2006; Rotaris, 
2017) 
2 (Carattini et al., 
2017; Clinch and 
Dunne, 2006) 
 
Funding  technological 
innovation and energy 
efficiency  
2 (Clinch and Dunne, 
2006; Klok et al., 
2006) 
1 (Dresner et al., 
2006b) 
2 (Clinch et al., 
2006; Hsu et al., 
2008) 
 
Redistributive 
Redistributing revenue 
to vulnerable groups 
(low income 
households, elderly) 
3 (Carson et al., 
2010; Carattini et al., 
2017; Saelen and 
Kallbekken, 2011) 
3 (Baranzini and 
Carattini, 2017; 
Clinch and Dunne, 
2006; Gevrek and 
Uyduranoglu, 2015) 
3 (Baranzini et al., 
2014; Klok et al., 
2006; Rotaris, 
2017) 
 
Equal share of revenue 
given to each taxpayer 
 
2 (Carattini et al., 
2017; Carattini et 
al. 2019) 
1 (Lachapelle et 
al., 2012) 
 
Other 
Environmental tax 
reform (reducing 
existing taxes) 
2 (Hsu et al., 2008 for 
income tax 
reduction; 
Leiserowitz et al., 
2013 for income and 
payroll taxes) 
2 (Clinch et al., 
2006; Hsu et al., 
2008 for goods and 
services tax 
reduction) 
2 (Beuermann 
and Santarius, 
2006; Carattini et 
al., 2019) 
7 (Carattini et 
al., 2017; Clinch 
and Dunne, 
2006; Dresner 
et al., 2006b;  
Kallbekken and 
Aasen, 2010; 
Klok et al., 
2006; 2 
different taxes 
in Kotchen et 
al., 2017; 
Lachapelle et 
al., 2012) 
Tax rebate   5 (Amdur, 2014; 
Baranzini et al., 
2014; Lachapelle et 
al., 2012; 
Leiserowitz et al., 
 1 (Baranzini and 
Carattini, 2017) 
  
2013; Kaplowitz 
and McCright, 
2015) 
Finance public transport 1 (Kaplowitz and 
McCright, 2015) 
  2 (Clinch et al., 
2006; Dresner, 
et al., 2006b) 
Deficit reduction 
  
2 (Amdur, 2014; 
Kotchen et al., 
2017) 
1 (Kotchen et 
al., 2017) 
General government 
budget 
   
5 (Beuermann 
and Santarius, 
2006; Gevrek 
and 
Uyduranoglu, 
2015; 
Kallbekken and 
Aasen, 2010; 
Rotaris, 2017; 
Kaplowitz and 
McCright, 2015) 
Notes: *Amdur, 2014; Baranzini et al., 2014; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Beuermann and Santarius, 
2006; Carattini et al. 2019; Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch et al., 2006; Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; 
Dresner et al., 2006a; Dresner et al., 2006b; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu, 2015; Kallbekken and Aasen, 
2010; Kotchen et al., 2017; Lachapelle et al, 2012; Saelen and Kallbekken, 2011.  
 
Several revenue-use options dealing with redistribution in order to obtain a less 
regressive outcome were identified in the studies. Redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups 
such as low income households and the elderly is purposely designed to be progressive by 
providing lower-income households with a higher amount of the tax revenue. The elderly are 
separately mentioned as they are especially vulnerable to low temperatures and therefore to 
higher energy prices. It was found to be the most preferred option in three studies and the 
second one in three other studies. Equal share of revenue given to each taxpayer was the 
second preferred option in two studies and the third option in one study. It is considered 
progressive because fixed amounts of compensation account for a greater proportion of 
income in low-income households. Moreover, since low-income households tend to spend 
less, in absolute terms, on energy consumption than high-income households, then the former 
will receive more through the monetary transfer than the cost increase they suffer (Chiroleu-
Assouline and Fodha, 2014; Klenert and Mattauch, 2016). 
Within other type of uses, recycling revenue through reducing existing taxes, which is 
known as environmental tax reform, is considered the preferred option and the second best 
option by two studies each. However, reducing existing taxes did not receive much support 
from the general public, as it was found the least favoured option in seven studies. There are 
mainly three reasons that can explain this opposition. Firstly, people do not trust that the 
government will actually do as promised. Dresner et al. (2006b) found that people “did not 
believe that other taxes would be reduced in reality or that the money would be spent on 
what was promised.” Secondly, people are sceptical about the idea of a double dividend of 
environmental tax reform (Deroubaix and Lévèque, 2006; Klok et al., 2006). Double dividend 
refers to recycling carbon pricing revenues by reducing distortionary taxes (e.g. labour taxes, 
income taxes) may have positive impacts on economic growth, employment, or technological 
  
development (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994; ). Some studies recognise the difficulty of 
achieving a double dividend due to the complex interactions between carbon pricing policies 
and the fiscal system (see Goulder (2013) for a detailed identification of the necessary 
conditions). Thirdly, people question the environmental effectiveness of shifting the tax 
because if people have the same amount of money at the end, there is no incentive to reduce 
consumption of taxed-products (Clinch and Dunne, 2006). In this sense, people have no 
conception that the relative cost of different things would change as a consequence of a tax 
shift. Tax rebates received support as the second most preferred option in five studies. 
Baranzini et al. (2014) report that people preferred it because it could be a way to reward 
those companies and households reducing their energy demand. Financing public transport 
was the preferred option in one study but the least one in another. Finally, the uses that 
received less support were government deficit reduction and revenues going into the general 
budget.  
Only one study showed explicitly the extent to which different uses of revenues affect 
people’s perception of fairness of the instrument. Jagers et al. (2018) analysed the effects of 
two different uses of CO2 tax revenues in a proposal to increase this tax in Sweden, a general 
cut in income tax for all Swedes and an individual tax rebate only to those paying the CO2 tax. 
The study reported that the fairness rating increases from the option without any 
compensation to the option for equal compensation through a general cut in income tax and 
further increases with an individual tax rebate. However, neither equal nor individual 
compensation have any noticeable effect on policy support.  
Our results show that options that use the revenues generated by carbon pricing to 
make the policy fairer – redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups or equal share of revenue 
given to each taxpayer – are preferred in certain studies whereas environmental uses of 
revenues tend to be more preferred overall.  
4.2 Impact of people’s preferences for revenue use on carbon tax acceptability 
We now analyse whether the different uses of revenues of carbon pricing as discussed in 
Section 4.1 affect its public acceptability. An overview of the results is given in Table 4. In 
general, the level of acceptability increases when revenues are recycled in some way, rather 
than going to the general government budget. For instance, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) 
found that acceptability increased to 64% of a sample in Switzerland when revenues were 
recycled according to people’s preferred recycling option, which was 15% more than without 
earmarking. However, 36% of the sample considered that earmarking revenues was not 
sufficient for them to accept the carbon tax.  
  
  
 
Table 4. Effects of people’s preferences for revenue use on policy acceptability  
 
Use of revenues Significant effect Non-significant γ Direction of 
influence 
Environmental  
Environmental  projects 8 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006*; 
Clinch et al., 2006*; Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006*; Dresner et al., 
2006b*; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu, 2015; Rotaris, 2017; Saelen and 
Kallbekken, 2011) 
 
+ 
1 (Carattini et al., 2017)  - 
Funding technological innovation and 
energy efficiency 
2 (Hsu et al., 2008; Dresner et al., 2006b*) 1 (Bristow et al., 2010) + 
Redistributive 
Redistributing revenue to vulnerable 
groups (low income households, elderly)  
4 (Carattini et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Gevrek and 
Uyduranoglu, 2015; Saelen and Kallbekken, 2011) 
1 (Baranzini and Carattini, 2017) + 
Equal share of revenue given to each 
taxpayer 
1 (Carattini et al., 2017) 1 (Bristow et al., 2010) + 
Other  
Environmental tax reform (reducing 
existing taxes) 
1 (Hsu et al., 2008)   + 
4 (Beuermann and Santarius, 2006*; Clinch et al., 2006*; Dresner 
et al., 2006a*; Jagers et al., 2018) 
2 (Bristow et al., 2010; Carattini et al., 
2017) 
- 
  
Tax rebate  1 (Kaplowitz and McCright, 2015)  + 
1 (Jagers et al., 2018)  - 
Funding public transportation 3 (Bristow et al., 2010; Dresner et al., 2006b*; Kaplowitz and 
McCright, 2015) 
 
+ 
Mitigate negative impacts of climate 
change 
1 (Rotaris, 2017)  + 
Fund improvements to infrastructure 
(roads, bridges…) 
1 (Kaplowitz and McCright, 2015)  + 
General budget 1 (Bristow et al., 2010)  - 
Note:  
γ Non-significant, relating to a quantitative study. 
*Qualitative study (all other studies are quantitative).  
  
  
Earmarking for environmental projects, in particular renewable energy development, 
affected positively people’s acceptability of carbon pricing in four quantitative studies and in 
four qualitative papers. Nevertheless, it decreased acceptability in one study (Carattini et al., 
2017). One explanation for the discordant result found by Carattini et al. (2017) could be the 
low public support for a somewhat unusual revenue use, namely purchasing foreign carbon 
credits. Funding technological innovation and energy efficiency was found to positively affect 
people’s policy acceptability in three studies, although one of them was non-significant.  
With regards to revenue-use options that makes carbon pricing less regressive, we 
found that redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups and an equal share of revenue given to 
each taxpayer increased people’s acceptability in five studies (one non-significant) in case of 
the former and two studies in case of the later (one non-significant). Within other types of 
revenue uses, an environmental tax reform (reducing existing taxes) was found to affect 
negatively the acceptability of the instrument in six studies. However, two of them had a non-
significant effect (Bristow et al., 2010; Carattini et al., 2017). Significant effects resulted in a 
proposal for an environmental tax reform to reduce labour costs in general terms (Beuermann 
and Santarius, 2006; Clinch et al., 2006; Dresner et al., 2006a) and a general cut in income tax 
for all Swedes (Jagers et al., 2018). However, another study found that reducing taxes on 
income as well as goods and services positively affects people’s acceptability of carbon pricing 
(Hsu et al., 2008). If we look closer to preferences among different types of stakeholders, 
studies found that implementing an environmental tax reform and using the revenues for 
giving grants to industry increased carbon pricing acceptability among business 
representatives (Klok et al., 2006). On the contrary, Deroubaix and Leveque (2006) found that 
using carbon pricing revenues to reduce existing taxes decreased business representatives’ 
acceptability of carbon pricing.  
Using the revenues for refunding citizens through a tax rebate showed contradictory 
results. One study (Kaplowitz and McCright, 2015) found that Americans increased their policy 
acceptability when the extra revenue was refunded equally to American families via a tax 
rebate. In contrast, a study by Jagers et al. (2018) showed that an individual compensatory 
scheme directing tax rebates only to those paying the CO2 tax decreased policy support among 
Swedish citizens. Funding public transportation positively influenced people’s acceptability of 
carbon pricing in three studies.  
 
5. Discussion  
Our review has shed light on perceived personal consequences, distributional effects and 
procedural aspects that co-determine perceived fairness which affects policy acceptability. It 
further shows that people’s perceived fairness of carbon pricing affects positively its 
acceptability.  
We have found that people express a high concern over the uneven distribution of the 
policy burden, with a particular focus on poor people. Furthermore, the perception that the 
instrument can be regressive reduced people’s acceptability of the policy whereas a neutral 
and progressive distribution of the policy costs increased instrument acceptability. Somewhat 
surprisingly, people do not show a clear preference for using the revenues generated by the 
carbon pricing scheme in ways that make the policy fairer by reducing its regressive effects. 
  
Instead, funding renewable energy projects is most often the preferred option. Several factors 
might explain this.  
First, results show that many people are sceptical that taxation may change behaviour 
much on its own. This scepticism possibly underlies the finding that people think revenues 
should be used to reinforce emissions reduction by allocating them to relevant environmental 
projects. Baranzini et al. (2014) find that people considered that if the revenues are used for 
something different than environmental purposes, then the government would lose its 
credibility regarding how urgent addressing climate change is.  
Secondly, people confound regulatory taxes aimed at changing behaviour (from high- to 
low-carbon consumption or production) with taxes aimed at generating public revenues. 
Consequently, they incorrectly confuse the main purpose of environmental taxes with the 
second type, i.e. raising revenues and thus consider it logical to use these revenues for 
environmental purposes. Some hope for public understanding of this difference comes from 
Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), who found that more than half of their participants understood 
the principal purpose of environmental taxes as regulating and reducing emissions. This 
suggests people are able to understand regulatory taxation and that information explaining 
the purpose of carbon taxes can create broader support for them. However, Kallbekken et al. 
(2011) found no evidence that providing information about the functioning of Pigouvian 
(regulatory) taxes reduces tax aversion.  
Thirdly, a generally low preference for revenue uses to decrease regressive effects of 
carbon pricing might be due to a lack of either awareness or trust that carbon pricing with 
appropriate revenue recycling is progressive or fair. According to Carattini et al. (2017), making 
distributional effects salient increased people’s preference for progressive designs of carbon 
taxes – through payments for low-income households or by an equal share of revenue given to 
everyone. A fourth explanation, illustrated by Baranzini et al. (2014), is that, despite being 
concerned about the regressive impacts of carbon pricing, some people did not consider 
redistributing revenue to low income households a viable option due to its large administrative 
burden. Having said all this, it should be noted that redistributing revenue to low income 
households was still the second most favourite revenue use option, and significantly increased 
people’s acceptability of carbon pricing.  
The preference for redistributive uses of the revenue is linked to the socioeconomic 
characteristics of people surveyed. For instance, Carattini et al. (2017) find that low-income 
households showed a marked preference for progressive designs. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 
(2015) provided similar evidence in this regard. This suggests that individual socioeconomic 
characteristics influence people’s concerns about distributional and procedural effects. Future 
research could look more systematically into the relationship between differences in 
socioeconomic characteristics and fairness perceptions, as well as the links between perceived 
personal and distributional effects, and how all this in turn affects policy acceptability.  
Procedural aspects seem to play a greater role in determining the preference for 
revenue uses than distributional effects, especially regarding environmental earmarking. Some 
studies link people favouring environmental earmarking with distrust in governments, as 
earmarking constrains policymaking and thus functions as a credible commitment device 
(Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006). Procedural aspects can explain the low preference for 
environmental tax reform (lowering other taxes) mainly because people do not trust that the 
government will actually keep its promise. 
  
It is widely accepted that all countries, in particular large CO2 emitters, need to reinforce 
its climate policy in order to fulfil the Paris Agreement. Carbon pricing is a recommended 
policy for that goal; however, a lack of public acceptability can jeopardize its effective 
implementation and stability. Paying attention to policy acceptability and designing carbon 
pricing schemes that can count with people’s support is thus necessary to ensure policy roll 
out. The effects of carbon pricing on personal consequences, distributional effects and 
procedural aspects as well as its perceived fairness should be carefully analysed in each 
specific case as they will depend on the precise design of the carbon pricing scheme. Recent 
French protests against the implementation of carbon tax illustrate the urgency and need for 
better understanding the reasons why people accept carbon pricing schemes or not. The 
French case demonstrates that people’s perceptions of fairness of the policy instrument are 
complex and depend on a broad set of contextual factors. For instance, lack of trust in 
government and the implementation of other regressive policies by President Macron - such as 
the simultaneous cancellation of a wealth tax, likely had considerable influence on the popular 
rejection of the tax.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We reviewed the role of perceived fairness in studies addressing people’s acceptability of 
carbon pricing. A main finding is that people´s perception of carbon pricing as fair strengthens 
its policy acceptability. The review indicated that fairness perceptions cover personal 
consequences, distributional effects and procedural aspects.  
Our results reveal further that higher energy prices and reduction of purchasing power 
are the personal consequences mentioned most often, whereas impacts on poor households 
and uneven distribution of the policy burden between firms and households or among the 
latter are the most perceived distributional effects. Distrust in government and over the good 
use of revenues generated by the carbon pricing instrument were frequently mentioned 
concerns related with procedural aspects of the policy. Several personal and distributional 
perceived effects influence positively people’s policy acceptability, among which are 
considering that the policies have a neutral or a progressive cost distribution. Our results 
showed that expected higher energy prices, less purchasing power and a regressive incidence 
of the policy decrease policy acceptability. Several procedural aspects increase carbon pricing 
acceptability, such as people’s satisfaction with governmental information provision about the 
policy and people trusting their government. 
Our review indicates that although people express high concern over the uneven 
distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer to use the carbon pricing revenues for 
environmental projects instead of inequity compensation. In addition, it should be noted that 
redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups still comes out as the second most favourite 
revenue use option, which significantly increases people’s acceptability of carbon pricing.  
Although our results are mostly from North American and European countries, several 
policy insights can be provided in order to increase public acceptability of carbon pricing by 
making the policy fairer. Carbon pricing needs to be implemented complementarily to other 
policies, in particular those that ensure the development of products and services that are 
alternatives to CO2-intensive ones. A common concern expressed regarding procedural aspects 
  
was that insufficient information is provided by governments about carbon taxation and the 
use of revenues. Hence, providing more information could be a relatively cheap and effective 
way to increase public acceptability. Moreover, it would likely improve people’s trust in 
government, which was the main concern expressed about procedural aspects. 
Preferences for using the revenues to make the policy progressive may increase in the 
future, particularly in countries that suffer considerable (or rising) socioeconomic inequality. In 
this sense, our results suggest that a combination of redistributing revenue to vulnerable 
groups and funding environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems the best 
option to explore in the future that can significantly increase people’s policy acceptability. In 
fact, an analysis of the various countries that had implemented carbon pricing schemes by 
2013 revealed that almost none of them combine these two revenue uses (Carl and Fedor, 
2016). New carbon pricing schemes have been implemented recently, which allows for further 
research to compare our findings regarding public acceptability of carbon pricing recycling 
options against how revenue is recycled in more recently implemented carbon pricing 
schemes.  
Future research is also needed regarding public policy acceptability in low- and middle-
income countries, given that carbon pricing policies are spreading there as well. Moreover, 
further exploring public preferences for different types of environmental projects in which to 
invest revenues is necessary, because the nature of, and realistic prospects for, such projects 
are not very clear. For example, renewable energy projects tend to garner much support but 
are often undertaken by private partners rather than the public sector. Public support in this 
case could take the form of innovation or adoption subsidies, which might, however, trigger 
different public responses in terms of fairness perceptions and policy acceptance than the 
more general notion of ‘funding environmental projects’. We encourage future work to test 
and refine proposed frameworks for carbon pricing, taking systematically into account all the 
relationships described. 
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